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INTRODUCTION 
Evaluating the Drivers’ amended complaint under the proper pleading 
standard—and not the one requiring “specificity” the ICE Agents have 
manufactured—reveals that at best, the ICE Agents motion to dismiss is premature 
as disputes of historical facts exist, including (1) the availability and content of the 
Drivers’ citizenship information on file with the Philadelphia Parking Authority 
(the “PPA”), (2) the reasonableness of the ICE Agents’ inclusion of the Drivers on 
the list after searching two databases and taking a year to execute the investigation, 
and (3) whether the Drivers were asked to remain at the PPA and voluntarily 
agreed after their citizenship had been confirmed or whether the Drivers were 
expressly told they could not leave. 
The ICE Agents spend much of their brief asserting that the Drivers have not 
pled facts sufficient to entitle them to relief or to show that the ICE Agents are not 
entitled to qualified immunity.  These assertions, however, are based on the ICE 
Agents’ attempt to disregard, recast, and cherry-pick the facts in the amended 
complaint surrounding their arrest and interrogation of the Drivers.  But the ICE 
Agents ignore that all of the Drivers’ factual allegations in their Complaint must be 
accepted as true, and the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to 
the Drivers.  Moreover, the ICE Agents ignore that it is their burden to establish 
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they are entitled to qualified immunity and that their declarations may not be 
considered in support. 
Accordingly, the district court’s order granting the defendant-appellees’ 
motion to dismiss should be vacated and this case should be remanded with 
instructions to allow the plaintiff-appellants to amend their complaint if necessary 
and for additional discovery.  
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ICE AGENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY FOR INTERROGATING THE DRIVERS.   
The ICE Agents have not proven that they are entitled to qualified immunity 
for their arrest and interrogation of the Drivers.  Reasonable ICE agents in the 
circumstances would know that a self-imposed failure to confirm the Drivers’ 
citizenship cannot create probable cause or reasonable suspicion justifying such 
intrusion on the Drivers’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizures.  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (detailing the 
two-part test for qualified immunity).  See also Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 642 
F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The burden of establishing qualified immunity falls 
to the official claiming it as a defense.”).  Rather, the existence of disputed 
historical facts—including the availability and content of the Drivers’ citizenship 
information on file with the PPA, and the reasonableness of the ICE Agents’ 
inclusion of the Drivers on the list after searching two databases and taking a year 
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to execute the investigation— highlights the need for discovery and renders the 
ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss premature.  See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“[A] decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there 
are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis” as “the 
existence of disputed, historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an 
officer’s conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”).      
Regarding the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the 
facts alleged by the Drivers show a violation of a constitutional right—the Drivers 
have pled sufficient facts to show that the ICE Agents violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures when they arrested and 
interrogated the Drivers absent either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  
The Drivers plainly established that the ICE Agents’ authority to interrogate 
and arrest suspected aliens under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(1) and  (a)(2), respectively, 
is constrained by the Fourth Amendment, “which demands something more than 
the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Government.”  AOB 21-29, citing 
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (rejecting the government’s 
assertion that warrantless seizures under  § 1357(a)(1) may be justified solely an 
immigration agent’s discretion).  Accordingly, arrests under § 1357(a)(2) must be 
justified by probable cause, Olivia-Ramos v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 
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285 (3d Cir. 2012), while interrogations under § 1357(a)(1) must be justified by 
reasonable suspicion, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.    
The ICE Agents fail to address this well-settled principle, instead suggesting 
that this statutory authority provides them with carte blanche qualified immunity.  
See, e.g., AB 29 (“The Drivers’ detention for purposes of ascertaining their 
immigration status is part of the Agents’ job, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357, even if 
the Drivers were ultimately determined to be U.S. Citizens.”).  Indeed, despite 13 
pages in the Drivers’ initial brief addressing the significance of section 1357,  see 
generally AOB 21-34, the ICE Agents make the flatly untrue statement that “the 
Drivers fail to address the fact that the appellee ICE Agents were authorized by 
statute to interrogate persons like the Drivers who are suspected of being in the 
U.S. illegally.”  AB 16.   
Moreover, the ICE Agents’ attempt to frame the constitutional right at issue 
here as a question of whether their conduct in “compiling the list” violated the 
Constitution is a red herring.  The Drivers agree that compiling a list does not 
violate the Constitution without anyone acting on the list.  But what the ICE 
Agents did with the list runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s protections: they 
arrested the Drivers under purported suspicion of being aliens in the U.S. illegally, 
using the list to claim probable cause.  The list, however, cannot provide the 
necessary probable cause first because it was the product of the ICE Agents’ 
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inability to confirm the Drivers’ citizenship based on their own needlessly deficient 
investigation as such information was readily available with the PPA and other less 
intrusive methods were available.   It also could not provide probable cause even if 
adequately investigated because it was of such a general nature that only an 
interrogation under reasonable suspicion could possibly have been reasonable.   
The ICE Agents’ initial seizure of the Drivers—and they do not dispute that 
they seized the Drivers—constitutes an arrest.  The ICE Agents dispute that the 
seizure was an arrest because “[t]he agents planned to question the Drivers 
pursuant to § 1357(a)(1),” and there was “no plan to arrest any person who was 
identified as a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.”  AB 7.  But this misses 
the point: the ICE Agents subjective intent is irrelevant.  See Whren v. U.S., 517 
U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).1
In further support of the ICE Agents’ assertion that there was no arrest, they 
point to the fact that “although the Drivers allege that they were ‘attacked, thrown 
against the wall,’ and ‘told [they] were being arrested, at no time was any one of 
   
                                           
1 Nevertheless, the ICE Agents’ brief inaccurately restates McDonald’s declaration 
on this subject.  McDonald did not declare that there was “no plan to arrest any 
person identified as a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident” as the ICE 
Agents’ brief asserts, AB 7; rather, he stated, “The plan did not include arresting or 
holding any drivers beyond the time of their being identified as legally in the U.S.”  
JA74 (emphasis added).   
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the Drivers transported away from the PPA facility as were others who were placed 
under arrest because they were discovered to be in the U.S. illegally,” AB 7-8, and 
the Drivers were only handcuffed “because the PPA facility was not a secure 
facility and the agents had no way of knowing if any of the drivers would be 
armed,” AB 7.  This factual narrative is irrelevant and self-servingly incomplete.  
The ICE Agents’ purported justification for handcuffing the Drivers and throwing 
them against the wall does not change the fact that they placed the Drivers under 
severe custody characteristic only of an arrest.  See U.S. v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 
105 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that whether an arrest has occurred is an objective 
inquiry based on “what a reasonable person would believe based on the 
circumstances of the interrogation”).   
Moreover, the ICE Agents ignore that besides being told they were being 
arrested, thrown against the wall, and handcuffed, the ICE Agents and their 
subordinates also took the Drivers’ identification documents, JA47, 52, 56; 
displayed weapons, JA49, 53, 59, 74-75; were dressed in raid gear, id.; had twenty-
two ICE agents present, JA74; and interrogated each plaintiff for over an hour, 
JA48, 52, 57.  These circumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in the 
Drivers’ position would believe they were under arrest.    
Moreover, no probable cause existed to arrest the Drivers because the list 
was not reasonably trustworthy information to warrant a person of reasonable 
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caution to conclude that the Drivers were aliens in the country illegally and that 
they were likely to escape before a warrant for their arrest could be obtained.  See 
U.S. v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[Probable cause] exists 
whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within an arresting 
officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to 
conclude that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being 
arrested.”); §1357(a)(2).2
U.S. v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237 (8th Cir. 2010), does not counsel otherwise.  
The ICE Agent’s reliance on Quintana to provide an analogous case is misplaced 
as the case is easily distinguishable.  The absence of the plaintiff’s name in a 
records search provided probable cause in Quintana because the context was a 
traffic stop where the thoroughness of such a search and availability of other 
  Here, the absence of documentation confirming the 
Drivers’ status cannot rise to the level of indicating that they are, in fact, likely to 
be illegal aliens.  See Mountain High Knitting, Inc. v. Reno, 51 F.3d 216 (9th Cir. 
1995) (recognizing that “although the lack of documentation or other admission of 
illegal presence may be some indication of illegal entry, it does not, without more, 
provide probable cause of the criminal violation of illegal entry”).   
                                           
2 Under § 1357(a)(2),immigration officials are statutorily permitted, without a 
warrant, to “arrest any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that the 
alien is . . . in violation of any such law or regulation [regarding the admission, 
exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens] and is likely to escape before a warrant 
can be obtained . . . .” 
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options is extremely limited if it is to be reasonable.  Here, however, no such 
restrictions existed as the ICE Agents did not execute the operation plan until over 
a year later.  That the ICE Agents would suggest a cursory, minutes-long search is 
analogous to the facts here raises its own questions.  Moreover, the Border Patrol 
Agent in Quintana had reason to believe that the alien was likely to escape before a 
warrant could be obtained.  That is not the case here.  No evidence exists to 
suggest that the Drivers were, at any time, an escape risk, and the ICE Agents have 
not argued otherwise.  
Regardless, whether the ICE Agents’ seizure of the Drivers constitutes an 
arrest under §1357(a)(2), or an interrogation under §1357(a)(1), requiring 
reasonable suspicion, is of no matter.  In determining whether an officer had 
reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court has considered the “totality of the 
circumstances,” and “whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and 
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”  U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
273 (2001) (overturning lower court’s formalistic methodology for determining 
reasonable suspicion).  Under either analysis, the scope of the seizure was not 
reasonably related to the ICE Agents’ purpose of identifying illegal aliens, 
balanced against the Drivers’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures, see Lee 
v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 499-500 (3d Cir. 1979), and the list did not provide sufficient 
justification.    
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First, the scope of the ICE Agents’ seizure of the Drivers is not sufficiently 
limited in scope.  The seizure posed a far more significant burden than necessary to 
effectuate the ICE Agents’ purpose of identifying illegal aliens.  Indeed, the decoy 
refund scheme the ICE Agents’ created to lure the cab drivers to the PPA for a 
secret arrest and interrogation, where the Drivers were thrown against the wall, 
handcuffed, and interrogated for over an hour is a far cry from the routine 
questioning in Lee, 590 F.2d  at 502 (finding that an officer’s questioning of 
individuals was justified in scope, given that he merely approached the individuals 
speaking in Chinese near a restaurant known to hire illegal immigrants, identified 
himself as an agent, and inquired about their identity) or INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 
210, 218 (1984) (finding that an INS agent’s questioning of factory workers was 
justified in scope as the factory workers were allowed to continue with their 
routine despite the agents’ presence).  Moreover, the interrogations lasted over an 
hour, JA48, 52, 57, which is far longer than the momentary interrogations found to 
be reasonable in scope in cases like Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880 (given the 
interests of border patrol agents in securing the borders, it is reasonable to allow 
agents to illicit “a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production 
of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States”).     
Importantly, the ICE Agents fail to explain why other less objectively and 
subjectively intrusive methods were not used where the ICE Agents were unable to 
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confirm citizenship such as individually questioning the Drivers outside the 
context of this operation or sending them a different letter from the PPA requesting 
updated citizenship information for payroll purposes.   
Second, the list does not create reasonable suspicion.  That the ICE Agents 
were purportedly unable to confirm the Drivers’ citizenship results from their own 
unreasonable failing.  See JA46, 73-74.  See also Orhorhaghe v. I.N.S., 38 F.3d 
488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding a plaintiff’s “Nigerian-sounding name” and the 
absence of his name in INS records for lawful entry into the U.S. did not create 
reasonable suspicion he was illegally in the country); Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760 
F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that a border patrol officer who knew only 
that an alien was working in the fields and his co-workers had fled upon sight of 
marked border patrol detail, that the individual was an alien, and that alien claimed 
to possess documents showing his legal status, did not have reasonable suspicion to 
believe individual was an alien illegally in the U.S.) .   
The ICE Agents conclusory statement that the PPA did not have 
immigration information for the Drivers, see AB 27, is belied by the fact that the 
PPA Enforcement Manager stated that they had information such as “ Social 
Security numbers and things like that.”  AB 22 (quoting JA92).  And as the ICE 
Agents must certainly know, Social Security Numbers can be used to confirm 
United States citizenship.  To the extent the ICE Agents claim the Drivers may 
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have forged that information, they provide no factual basis supporting reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to believe any drivers had done so.   
The ICE Agents assert that that they are entitled to qualified immunity for 
reasonable mistakes, AB 30, but they fail to explain how their mistake of arresting 
the Drivers was reasonable.  Even though the ICE Agents state that they checked 
“immigration databases” and ran “criminal history” checks, JA73, they offer no 
information on what these databases and history checks said about the Drivers 
here.  Indeed, in U.S. v. Quintana,—the same case the ICE Agents rely upon to 
claim their arrest of the Drivers was based on probable cause—the Eighth Circuit 
admonished the Border Patrol Agents for failing to make “a better showing that the 
databases preliminarily searched by Agent Bane and the Grand Forks Patrol 
Dispatch are sufficiently thorough and complete to permit a reasonable Border 
Patrol Agent to infer that [the plaintiff] was present in the country illegally.”  623 
F.3d at 1241.3
And the faulty premise that the year span initiation and execution of the 
operation and the fact that various versions of the list were exchanged therein 
reflects a thorough investigation ignores that, taken in the light most favorable to 
the Drivers, rather than reflect diligence, this delay indicates neglect, inefficiency, 
   
                                           
3 The Border Patrol’s failure to provide such information was not dispositive there 
because the plaintiff’s reply memorandum did not challenge the database or the 
inference the Border Patrol Agent drew.  Id.   
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and non-urgency, as established by the ICE Agents’ failure to determine the 
Drivers’ citizenship despite readily available evidence and ICE’s tremendous 
resources.  Indeed, this dispute of historical fact illustrates yet another reason why 
discovery is necessary and the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss is premature.  See 
Curley, 298 F.3d at 278 (“[T]he existence of disputed, historical facts material to 
the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct will give rise to a jury issue.”).   
Lastly, as required under the second prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis—that the Drivers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizures must be “clearly established”—and detailed in the Drivers’ initial brief, 
AOB 29-34, the ICE Agents have failed to show that reasonably competent ICE 
agents would believe that the ICE Agents’ arrest and interrogation of the Drivers 
was lawful because the Supreme Court has directly addressed the boundaries of the 
Fourth Amendment and §1357.  Therefore, no reasonably competent ICE agent can 
be excused from knowing that seizures grounded in anything less than probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion are unlawful.        
II. THE ICE AGENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY FOR CONTINUING TO DETAIN THE DRIVERS 
AFTER CONFIRMING THEIR CITIZENSHIP.    
The ICE Agents and their subordinates have also not shown that they are 
entitled to qualified immunity for their continued detention of the Drivers for 
several hours after confirming their citizenship.  Such detention cannot be based in 
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reasonable suspicion when the ICE Agents confirmed their citizenship, even to 
their own satisfaction, and no reasonable ICE agent would believe otherwise.  
The ICE Agents agree with the Drivers on the law governing when a seizure 
has occurred.  AB 32.  The ICE Agents, however, claim that the Drivers do not 
meet these standards based on their own incomplete factual narrative.  But this 
they may not do.  All of the Drivers’ factual allegations in the complaint must be 
accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the Drivers.  Byers v. 
Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010).   
The ICE Agents’ declarations, however, should not be considered in 
determining the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss because they constitute evidence 
beyond the complaint and, unlike the exhibits attached to the Drivers’ response, do 
not fall within the limited exception “for documents that are integral to or 
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.”  See West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 
Inc., v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation and marks omitted).  
Further, converting the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment so that the court may consider the declarations would also be improper as 
the Drivers have not been provided “reasonable opportunity to present all material 
that is pertinent to the motion” as required under  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).  At this 
time, no discovery has taken place, and the Drivers have not had the opportunity to 
refute the ICE Agents’ declaration.  Regardless, the ICE Agents’ declarations do 
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not rebut the Drivers’ allegations in their amended complaint—they further 
establish a triable issue fact on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to 
leave.  See JA73-76. 
The ICE Agents’ brief claims the Drivers’ travel was unrestricted.  AB 17.  
But that is flat untrue.  The amended complaint alleges that their travel was 
restricted, and the declarations do no state otherwise.  In any event, even if the ICE 
Agents would have let them go had they walked out the open door, the standard is 
not the ICE Agents’ subjective intent.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, (1968) (“If 
subjective good faith [on the part of the arresting officer] alone were the test, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 
‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of the 
police.”).  Rather, it is whether a reasonable person would have believed he was 
not free to leave in the situation of the Drivers in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest and interrogation.  Olivia-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 283-84.  
Given that the ICE Agents and their subordinates had already forcibly 
detained the Drivers by the ICE Agents’ own admission, AB 7, repeatedly told the 
Drivers that they were not permitted to leave despite being wrongfully seized, 
JA48, 53, 58, refused to allow them to speak or stand, JA48, 53, 58, and were 
dressed in raid gear and/or displaying guns strapped to their waists, including those 
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who stood by the exit, JA48, 49, 53, 58; see JA74-75, no reasonable person would 
believe he was free to get up and leave.   
The ICE Agents suggest at several places that they simply “ask[ed] the 
drivers to remain,” e.g., JA35, but they cite no support for that assertion, and their 
inadmissible hearsay declarations are not supported with direct quotes or even 
direct knowledge of what was actually said to the Drivers.  See JA76 (“Between 
0900 and 1000 hours, one team member told me that it had been suggested to the 
in-status drivers that they remain at the facility for a brief time after they had been 
processed, for officer safety reasons.  I was told that those drivers appeared to 
understand the reason for the request, and willingly complied.”).  Perhaps most 
importantly, given the context of the already-existing undisputed seizure, no 
reasonable person would feel free to leave until and unless the seizing authorities 
with guns expressly stated he was free to leave.  No declaration claims that the 
agents affirmatively told the Drivers they were free to leave.   
Moreover, the Drivers’ specifically pled that they were repeatedly advised 
that they were not permitted to leave, JA48, 49, 53, 58; plaintiff Shittu directly 
asked if he was permitted to leave but was told that “he had to sit in the room with 
the other taxi drivers who had been detained and was not permitted to leave,” 
JA49, and plaintiff Lawal expressly told the ICE Agents and their subordinates that 
“he just wanted to leave,” JA58.  These facts, accepted as true and construed in the 
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light most favorable to the Drivers, demonstrate that their continued detention was 
neither a voluntary choice nor consensual in nature.  Regardless, to the extent the 
ICE Agents justify their conduct in continuing to detain the Drivers based on the 
Drivers’ purported voluntary agreement to remain at the PPA, this dispute of 
historical fact provides another example of why the ICE Agents’ motion to dismiss 
is premature.  See Curley, 298 F.3d at 278.   
The ICE Agents do not dispute that they had no evidence on which to have a 
reasonable suspicion to detain the Drivers.  They claim continued detention was 
justified for safety reasons, but they do not connect those safety reasons to any 
articulable reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct by the Drivers.  And the mere 
possibility or subjective feeling that someone might be tipped off about an 
operation does not justify detaining everyone who knows about the operation.  See, 
e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (“To insist neither upon an 
appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular [individual] nor upon 
some other substantial and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of 
discretion ‘would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches . . . .”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 22); see also Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1144 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(rejecting officer’s belief that a suspect’s friend “knew more than he was willing to 
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say” about the suspect as sufficient to justify his continued detention because such 
conjecture was not anchored in any factual observation). 
Further, the ICE Agents’ reliance on U.S. v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 
1995), to support their safety rationale for suspicionless detention is misplaced. 4
Moreover, it is absurd.  The agents’ post-hoc claim of safety concerns 
assumes that these “armed” cab drivers would launch an assault on the facility 
rather than simply choose not to appear at the facility if they were tipped off.  Even 
if such a rationale existed, non-individualized concerns are insufficient to justify 
continued seizure of the Drivers.  ICE Agents cannot be permitted to invade 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights absent any evidence whatsoever by merely 
citing attenuated and fantastic safety concerns.  
  
See AB 34.  The court’s statement in Edwards that officers may “take such steps as 
are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status 
quo,” is predicated on the fact that the officers conducting the Terry stop had 
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a crime had been committed—
the court did not hold that concerns with officers’ safety justified a suspicionless 
detention.  Id. at 618-19.     
                                           
4 Notably, the ICE Agents’ assertion that they merely asked the Drivers to remain 
(and they did so voluntarily) undermines the seriousness of the ICE Agents’ 
purported safety concerns.    
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Moreover, in light of the requirement announced in Brignoni-Ponce that 
immigration officials may only exercise their authority to conduct warrantless 
seizures where reasonable suspicion exists, a reasonably competent ICE agent 
would know that continued detention of a U.S. citizen without a reasonable 
suspicion violates a clearly established constitutional right.  In light of the 
draconian detention methods employed by the ICE Agents—holding the Drivers 
against their will for several hours, and prohibiting them to stand, speak or leave 
the room, JA48-49, 53,57-59—no reasonable ICE agent would believe his conduct 
was a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment .  And any ICE agent 
reasonably aware of the law would understand that continuing to detain the Drivers 
for hours after confirming their citizenship would rise to a level far greater than a 
de minimis level of detention; rather, such confinement constitutes an unreasonable 
seizure in light of the clear contours of this jurisprudence.  
III. BIVENS CLAIMS DO NOT NEED TO BE PLED WITH 
SPECIFICITY.   
The facts pleaded in the amended complaint need only state a plausible 
claim for relief.  They do so, and the district court erred in holding otherwise.  
When considering a motion to dismiss, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), 
directs courts to ignore legal conclusions, to accept a complaint’s facts as true, and 
to apply a standard of plausibility to those facts.  The ICE Agents, however, ask 
this court to ignore the facts in the amended complaint, to accept the ICE Agents’ 
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preferred version of the facts—unsupported by even their own declarations—and 
to apply a standard of specificity to the ICE Agents preferred facts.   
 The ICE Agents’ primarily argue the Drivers did not allege personal 
involvement with sufficient specificity.  See AB 20, 21.  See also JA9-10 (stating 
the amended complaint did not identify “each Defendant’s specific actions” 
(emphasis added)).  But specificity is not required.  Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2006) (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of 
specifics.”).      
 The amended complaint alleges many non-conclusory facts.  The ICE 
Agents assert that the Drivers “allege only that ‘Defendants were present for and 
participated directly’ in the conduct [that violated the Drivers’ rights]” and assert 
one reason this allegation is “insufficiently particular” is “because the allegations 
are wholly lacking in any factual specificity indicating any individual Agent’s 
conduct or knowledge.”  AB 20.  But a review of the amended complaint reveals 
otherwise.  Regarding personal involvement, the Amended Complaint alleges 
“McDonald, Riley and Chow,” JA46: 
x “exchanged various versions of the certified operator list in an effort to 
create a working list,” JA46; 
x directed letters be sent to the Drivers advising each he was entitled to a 
refund, JA46, 47; 
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x “suddenly and violently attacked [each driver], thr[ew] [him] against a wall 
and handcuffed [him],” JA47, 48, 52, 56, 57; 
x were told by the Drivers that the Drivers were citizens, JA48, 52, 57; 
x “interrogated [each driver] for more than one hour,” JA48, 52, 57; 
x admitted to each driver the driver “had been mistakenly detained,” JA48, 53, 
57, 58; 
x nonetheless “repeatedly advised [each driver] that he was not permitted to 
leave,” JA48, 49, 53, 53, 58; 
x held the Drivers “for several additional hours,” JA48, 53, 58; and 
x prohibited the Drivers from “speak[ing] or stand[ing]” while held JA48, 53, 
58. 
Defendants ignore these factual allegations and ask this Court to do the same, the 
law directs otherwise. 
And these facts are entitled to a presumption of truth.  The ICE Agents 
incorrectly assert “[t]his Court is not required to assume . . . nonspecific allegations 
are true.”  AB 15-16.  Again, specificity is not the standard.  Instead, “a court must 
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint” except “legal 
conclusions.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  The facts laid out above are not legal 
conclusions; they recount events and are entitled to a presumption of truth.  
Ignoring the Supreme Court’s directive, the ICE Agents contradict the factual 
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allegations to create a narrative they prefer.  Indeed, their statement of facts cites 
sources other than the amended complaint and decision almost exclusively, 
acknowledging the amended complaint’s existence only once outside the opening 
and closing paragraphs of their five-page fact section.  AB 6-10.  In considering 
the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, it is the ICE Agents’ statement of 
facts that should be ignored, not the well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint. 
 Moreover, these facts state a plausible claim for relief.  The ICE Agents 
concede personal involvement “can be shown through allegations of personal 
direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.”  AB 19.  Regarding facts, they 
concede “Special Agent McDonald compiled the list of drivers invited to the PPA 
facility located at 2415 S. Swanson Street, in Philadelphia,” id. at 6, and 
“supervised the operation primarily from the first room the drivers entered, and 
circulated among the other rooms from time to time,” id. at 9.  They further 
concede Chow was present during the operation, arriving at the facility “to see how 
the operation was going.”  Id. at 8.  These concessions alone are sufficient to 
demonstrate that, at the very least, the ICE Agents knew what was going on and 
acquiesced in it.  The amended complaint’s allegations further establish these 
things for all the ICE Agents—because the ICE Agents themselves admitted to the 
Drivers they had been “mistakenly detained” and could not leave, the ICE Agents 
necessarily knew of the violations.  The personal involvement standard recognizes 
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it was incumbent upon the supervisory agents to respect the Drivers’ rights and 
release them as soon as the ICE Agents knew what was going on.  By not doing so, 
and acquiescing in the Drivers’ detention, the supervisory agents themselves 
violated the Drivers’ rights.  As the concessions and pleadings establish knowledge 
and acquiescence without speculation, the Drivers state a plausible claim for relief. 
The ICE Agents cite Iqbal and Rode v. Dellarciprete, as cases dismissing 
supervisors for lack of personal involvement.  Id. at 19.  However, those cases are 
distinguishable because they involved imposing liability on people “at the highest 
level[s] of the . . . law enforcement hierarch[ies],” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668,—the 
governor and attorneys general—not boots-on-the ground agents.  Id.; Rode, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Rode attempted to establish knowledge through 
“articles that appeared in newspapers throughout the state,” “through the 
introduction of a legislative resolution seeking an investigation into racially 
motivated retaliation against PSP employees, the filing of grievances with the 
Governor’s office of administration, and telephone calls and correspondence with 
the office of the Lieutenant Governor.”  845 F.2d at 1208.  The complaint did not 
allege the governor or attorney general were present for any of the wrongs, or that 
they even read the newspaper articles or reviewed the complaints.  See id. 
Iqbal is also distinguishable because it involved Bivens liability for 
“invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments,” 
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which the Supreme Court’s “decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and 
prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
676.  The ICE Agents wrongly suggest all Bivens liability requires an intentional 
violation of constitutional rights.  AB 7, 23.  However, “[t]he factors necessary to 
establish a Bivens violation . . . vary with the constitutional provision at issue,” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, and plaintiffs need not plead or prove purpose for Fourth 
Amendment violations.  See supra Parts I, II.  In Iqbal, the plaintiff’s allegations in 
ultimately failed because the actions pled were “merely consistent with” a 
discriminatory purpose, not necessarily done because of that purpose.  556 U.S. at 
678.  Because the drivers need not prove purpose, they need not allege purpose and 
their allegations that demonstrate participation, knowledge, and acquiescence are 
sufficient.  
 Heightening the pleading standard on Bivens claims would eviscerate the 
doctrine.  Rarely does an officer violating a citizen’s rights stop to make sure the 
citizen has his name for a future lawsuit.  Nor can citizens be expected to take 
copious notes in order to eventually draft a complaint with specificity.  The ICE 
Agents comment that “the Drivers allege that they themselves were present . . . yet 
no Driver can identify any Agent,” AB 21, not only ignores the allegations in the 
Amended Complaint, but also ignores that Bivens itself involved unnamed agents.  
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Here, 
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there are numerous culpable unnamed agents who likely will be added to the 
complaint after more discovery.5
 
  But the fact that there are other culpable 
unnamed agents does not make the named agents any less culpable. 
 
  
  
                                           
5 To the extent the failure to include John Doe defendants was a deficiency in the 
pleadings, “the District Court should not have dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims 
without either granting leave to amend or concluding that any amendment would 
be futile.”  Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants Oliver Lawal, Daosamid Bounthisane, 
and Gazali Shittun respectfully request that this Court reverse the judgment below. 
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